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Extradition, Taiwan and the Speciality Principle 
The latest judgment in the long-running attempt by Taiwan to extradite Zain Dean 
was handed down 6 June, in Dean v Lord Advocate [2019] HCJAC 31. The case 
was an appeal by Dean against a decision of the Scottish Ministers 1 August 2014 
to order his extradition. The judgment delivered another blow to Taiwanese 
prosecutors, similar in effect to the High Court decision Dean v Lord Advocate 
[2016] HCJAC 83. That case, subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in 
Dean v Lord Advocate [2017] UKSC 44, also upheld an appeal by Dean. In one 
sense, then, history is repeating itself. The High Court, similarly constituted and 
in a 2-1 decision, has again blocked the extradition of Dean. In another sense, 
however, the two cases are fundamentally different. They turned on wholly 
different points of extradition law.  
The 6 June judgment centred on the speciality rule of extradition found in section 
95 of the Extradition Act 2003 (the 2003 Act). The 2016 case and subsequent 
Supreme Court decision concerned human rights and the conditions facing Dean 
in a Taiwanese prison if extradited. Generally, the rule of speciality, also referred 
to as specialty, provides that where an individual is extradited he or she must only 
tried or punished for the crimes that were the subject of the extradition request, 
and no others. Specifically, section 95 firstly requires that an extradition must not 
take place in the absence of speciality arrangements. The section continues that 
such arrangements, or the law of the requesting territory, must provide that the 
requested person is only dealt with for the offences for which he was extradited, 
offences disclosed by the same facts, offences to which the Secretary of State has 
consented he is dealt with, or offences with which the requested person has 
waived his speciality right.  
Section 95 of the 2003 Act is relatively straightforward. Its application to the 
particular facts in a unique context is what led to the complexity of the case. 
Indeed, large parts of the 126 page judgment containing the three opinions of 
Lady Paton, Lord Drummond Young and Lady Clark are devoted to interpreting 
the extradition agreement with Taiwan and the information, missives and 
assurances provided subsequent to its conclusion in the light of section 95. 
Seemingly exasperated, Lady Clark described the course of the appeal as being 
beset with difficulties with the court having been required to cope with volumes of 
paperwork, new evidence and issues and changing submissions (at para 130). 
The crux of the case arose from the terms of the Memorandum of Association 
entered into by the UK and Taiwan to facilitate Dean’s extradition following his 
convictions there for drink driving, negligent manslaughter and leaving the scene 
of an accident. The present author described the previous litigation in The Wheels 
of Justice in Extradition (2017) 26 SLT 143. The MOU was necessary in the absence 
of a bilateral extradition treaty. That agreement, however, failed to align precisely 
with the speciality terms within the 2003 Act. The nature of the MOU led to it being 
criticised in the case as a “cut and paste job” (at para 148). Whilst it implicitly 
provided that Dean was to be extradited for the three conviction offences 
mentioned above, it did not allude to two offences that Dean had subsequently 
been charged with. These two offences, of absconding from Taiwan and the use 
of a third person’s passport, were instead first referred to as background narrative 
in the first extradition request made under the MOU on 28 October 2013. The fact 
that trial proceedings had been raised in Taipei District Court for these offences 
was not mentioned. The Scottish Ministers therefore were not aware of those 
pending proceedings when they ordered Dean’s extradition on 1 August 2014 for 
the conviction offences. Of greater relevance to the final decision in the case, 
however, was the disparity in wording between the speciality provisions in the 
MOU and section 95 of the 2003 Act. Paragraph 11.1.(b) of the MOU provided that 
a requested person may be dealt with for an offence not specified in the extradition 
request where it is “disclosed by the information provided”. In contrast, section 
95(4)(b) states that that may happen where the offence is “disclosed by the same 
facts of that offence, other than one in respect of which a sentence of death could 
be imposed”.  
The lack of effective speciality arrangements that satisfied section 95 was put 
forward by counsel for Dean in opposition to extradition. It was argued that he 
remained at risk of further prosecution. The evidence given on behalf of the 
Scottish Ministers could not be relied upon and the Taiwanese assurances had 
been undermined by events in Taiwan, counsel for Dean argued. Further, the 
status of the further assurances given by Taiwan was suggested to be unclear. On 
behalf of the Scottish Ministers it was averred that satisfactory speciality 
arrangements were in place, either under the MOU alone or the MOU in conjunction 
with subsequent Taiwanese assurances. Whilst certain of those assurances were 
not straightforward, it was argued that the principles of international comity, 
reciprocity, mutual trust and respect and good faith affecting extradition as well 
as the strong public interest in upholding the rule of law led to section 95 being 
satisfied. The criteria laid down by the European Court of Human Rights as to the 
validity of assurances in Othman v UK (2012) 55 EHRR 1 were met, it was argued. 
Dean v Lord Advocate [2019] HCJAC 31 is a complex judgment in which the three 
opinions given generally rely on different reasoning. The leading opinion is given 
by Lady Paton. Subsequent to setting out the law and arguments she addresses 
the rule of speciality, including its nature and purpose. In contrast to the view 
expressed on behalf of the Scottish Ministers, and that of Lord Drummond Young, 
she highlighted that it exists to provide protection to requested persons in addition 
for reasons of comity (at para 28). Lady Paton then measured paragraph 11 of 
the MOU governing speciality against the terms of section 95. She referred to the 
disparity in terminology noted above and then found that since the charges 
relating to absconding and passport misuse were not disclosed by the facts of the 
road traffic offences reliance upon paragraph 11 would breach section 95 (at para 
38).    
Lady Paton then goes on to consider whether the appeal, brought against the 
Scottish Ministers under section 108 of the 2003 Act, should be allowed under 
sections 109(3) or 109(4) or both. The former provides, in essence, that an appeal 
be allowed if the Scottish Ministers should have decided a question before them 
differently. She found that the information available to the Scottish Ministers was 
such that the mandatory provisions of section 95 were not met. She based her 
decision on the extradition being founded upon the MOU and the differences in 
terms between it and section 95. The further information provided to the Lord 
Advocate by Taiwan did not, she held, cure the ambiguity. Lady Paton upheld the 
appeal on the basis of section 109(3). She did likewise under section 109(4). This 
provides than an appeal be allowed where an issue or information was not raised 
or available when the case was considered and that, had it been, the extradition 
would not have been ordered. The information not known by the Scottish Ministers 
was that there were live proceedings against Dean. Affecting her decision under 
both subsections was the view that the MOU could not be modified or qualified by 
subsequent letters to the Lord Advocate or herself. A distinction was drawn 
between the present case and cases where, say, assurances about prison 
conditions are given. Overall, Lady Paton found that it appeared clear the 
Taiwanese authorities wished to prosecute Dean for the two alleged accusation 
offences although they were not included in the first request, and that the terms 
of the MOU and the subsequent assurances did not satisfy her that this would not 
in fact happen.  
Not specifically affecting Lady Paton’s decision were the interests of comity and 
reciprocity. She concludes her opinion, however, with a discussion of their 
relevance to the case. These comments are of particular import in light of the 
weight put upon them by Lord Drummond Young in his dissenting opinion. As 
regards reciprocity, she notes that the MOU was not ‘reciprocal’, in the sense of 
facilitating extradition in to the UK. It was a bespoke agreement to allow Dean’s 
extradition to Taiwan. Comity, she suggested, could not alter the plain meaning 
of the MOU and letters of assurance, properly construed. As to the validity of the 
assurances, Lady Paton held that even if the Othman criteria were met, the appeal 
should still be allowed. She went on, however, to hold that two of the criteria were 
not satisfied. Lady Paton held Dean be discharged and the order for his extradition 
quashed. 
In contrast to Lady Paton, Lord Drummond Young took a relatively broad approach 
in his reasoning that included reliance upon factors extrinsic to the case itself. It 
mirrored his stance in his dissenting opinion in the 2016 High Court judgment. He 
emphasised, for instance that maintenance of the rule of law at both a national 
and international level required that where an extradition request met the 
demands of speciality and double criminality, and came from a country where the 
rule of law was respected, it should normally be given effect. Of particular 
relevance, he held, was the point that where an agreement is entered into by the 
executive courts should assume that its requirements and of any supplementary 
undertakings will be observed in good faith.  
In line with his approach Lord Drummond Young noted that the critical question 
in the appeal was simply whether Dean should be extradited to Taiwan (at para 
82). Governing this was, of course, the MOU. In interpreting it Lord Drummond 
Young invoked the principles applying to the interpretation of international 
agreements, including that an agreement should be interpreted in good faith in 
the light of its object and purpose (at para 83). This, he held, meant that regard 
should be had to the primary substance of the agreement rather than the details 
of its wording. In applying this to the case, he considered whether the difference 
in terminology between the MOU and section 95 “… abrogated the principle of 
specialty” (at para 89). Ultimately he held that it did not. 
Again differing in emphasis from Lady Paton, Lord Drummond Young noted that 
the speciality principle exists to preserve comity between nations. The principle is 
part of international law and it is not to be regarded as a defence for an accused 
person, he suggested. In applying these principles Lord Drummond Young held 
that the MOU “… imposes substantially the same requirements…” as those found 
under section 95 of the 2003 Act (at para 96). The MOU itself, in paragraph 1(a), 
defined extradition as the surrender of Dean to Taiwan for the purpose of serving 
a sentence, Lord Drummond noted. The assurances given by Taiwan subsequent 
to its extradition arrest also gave effect to the speciality principle, he held. Dean’s 
appeal was refused for the above reasons, and the questions under sections 
109(3) and 109(4) were answered in the negative.  
A third approach to the case was taken by Lady Clark. In her opinion she 
concentrated on its foundations, noting that through the length of the proceedings 
and the passage of time the issues had become unfocussed (at para 144). Those 
foundations were the ministerial actions based on section 194 of the 2003 Act 
under which the special extradition arrangements with Taiwan were made. In 
discussing the difficulties caused by the MOU Lady Clark highlighted that Taiwan 
had made second and third extradition requests under it for the alleged 
absconding and passport misuse offences. This, she suggested, demonstrated 
Taiwanese misunderstanding of the MOU. In contrast, Lord Drummond Young had 
found this fact supported Taiwan’s good faith. Lady Clark emphasised that section 
95(3) of the 2003 Act gave a special definition of ‘speciality arrangements’, and 
whilst they might exist in a general sense they will not exist for the purpose of 
section 95 unless the statutory conditions are satisfied.  
Lady Clark then focused upon the speciality arrangements under the MOU. She 
criticised the agreement on account of its conflation of procedural, substantive 
and especial paragraphs reflecting its unique nature. She found that serious 
problems of interpretation arose as a result, even where a purposive approach 
was adopted. Lady Clark found that section 194 and the certification made under 
it brought the absence of arrangements for the MOU to be altered or given 
guidance or interpretation to the fore. The certification was conclusive evidence 
that arrangements have been made for the extradition of Dean as specified by the 
MOU. In other words Lady Clark highlighted that no provision was made to 
facilitate future assurances or undertakings relevant to speciality becoming part 
of the arrangements or to assist in their interpretation (at para 168). The MOU did 
provide for subsequent assurances in relation to the death penalty, but contained 
no such provision as regards speciality. Accordingly, Lady Clark held that the 
speciality arrangements were limited to the terms of the MOU itself. 
Lady Clark then considered the relevant provisions of the MOU directly in the light 
of section 95 of the 2003 Act. As with Lady Paton, the difference in wording 
between the MOU and the 2003 Act was important. She held that the MOU did not 
in its terms satisfy section 95(4)(b) of the 2003 Act. The provision was vague, and 
the more obvious interpretation, she found, was that paragraph 11.1(b) related 
to the conduct of alleged absconding and passport misuse.  
Further to the effect of the process under section 194 Lady Clark noted that whilst 
the content of ad hoc arrangements is for the contracting parties UK courts are 
obliged to impose the approach under the 2003 Act. They cannot “remake or 
revise arrangements agreed and certified at ministerial level, or to use post 
agreement extraneous documents to interpret the memorandum of 
understanding” (at para 181). She held that Scottish Ministers should not have 
taken into account a letter dated 25 July 2014 putatively containing an assurance, 
but in the event she was wrong on this the letter did not act to clarify paragraph 
11 of the MOU. Lady Clark concluded that the court was bound to oversee the 
legality of the decision making of ministers, and to consider whether the conditions 
in section 109 were met. She concentrated on ministerial decision making, and in 
the light of the need to observe that extradition procedures are strictly observed, 
held that the MOU was flawed. She upheld the appeal under section 109(3). 
Discussion  
Dean v Lord Advocate [2019] HCJAC 31 gives a fascinating insight into the law of 
extradition and judicial decision making. First human rights and now the principle 
of speciality have been successfully invoked to bar Dean’s extradition to Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese press suggests that a second appeal to the Supreme Court may be 
sought. What is notable in the case is the sheer breadth of relevant considerations. 
UK extradition law, Taiwanese law and procedure and international law and comity 
were all at play in the case at the outset and as it continue to evolve as being 
heard. It light of this it is perhaps not surprising that the three opinions within the 
judgment differed rather markedly. Whilst Lady Paton and Lady Clark agreed, their 
opinions contained differing emphases. Their general focus was on the 
compatibility of the MOU with the 2003 Act. Lady Paton’s analysis centred in 
particular upon statutory compliance and interpretation whilst Lady Clark’s largely 
turned upon the certification of the MOU and its compatibility with the 2003 Act. 
Lord Drummond Young, on the other hand, stayed true to the approach he took 
in the 2016 appeal and stood apart from the majority. He took a broad approach 
adhering to the presumption in favour of extradition. He appeared to recognise 
the sui generis nature of extradition hearings, something that taken place in 
England to a limited extent. The differing opinions also mirror the two conflicting 
purposes of extradition, that of cooperation and protection. Illustrating this are 
the discussions of the purposes of speciality where the principle is understood to 
both provide protection to requested persons and to respect the right of requested 
territories to extradite on their own terms. As it turned out, the protective purpose 
of the speciality principle prevailed and Dean was discharged.  
